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Long	Read	|	A	complex	tapestry	of	collusion	and
cooperation:	Afghanistan	and	Pakistan’s	terrorism
networks
On	12	May	2020	three	gunmen	stormed	the	Dasht-e-Barchi	hospital	in	Kabul	killing	many	inside.	Here	Sajjan	M.
Gohel	(Asia-Pacific	Foundation,	London	and	Visiting	Teacher,	LSE)	and	David	Winston	(Asia-Pacific
Foundation,	London)	analyse	the	terrorist	hydra	network	that	plotted	the	attack	and	how	the	complex	web	of
terrorist	groups	form	part	of	a	wider	grouping	within	Pakistan	and	across	South	Asia,	a	grouping	that	could	derail
peace	talks	between	the	Afghan	government	and	the	Taliban.
On	12	May	2020,	a	new	low	in	the	recent	history	of	violent	acts	of	terrorism	in	Afghanistan	was	reached	when	three
gunmen	stormed	the	Dasht-e-Barchi	hospital	in	Kabul	and	attacked	the	maternity	ward,	killing	nurses,	women	in
labour,	and	newly	born	babies.	The	group	of	terrorists	responsible	for	the	attack	gained	access	to	the	hospital
dressed	as	police	officers	and	moved	methodically	straight	to	the	maternity	section	of	the	hospital,	passing	other
buildings	and	wards	closer	to	the	entrance.
Two	women	were	killed	in	the	delivery	room,	dying	before	their	unborn	babies	drew	their	first	breaths.	One	was	shot
dead	beside	an	incubator	shielding	her	baby.	Eight	people	were	killed	in	their	hospital	beds,	including	two	new-born
babies.	Some	women	found	shelter	in	hospital	safe	rooms	with	one	patient	giving	birth	as	the	attack	ensued.
Afghan	special	forces,	quick	to	arrive	at	the	scene,	spent	hours	fighting	the	three	terrorists,	before	neutralising
them.	During	this	attack,	that	took	place	during	the	month	of	Ramadan,	24	people	lost	their	lives.	Médecins	sans
Frontières	(Doctors	Without	Borders),	who	had	played	an	important	role	in	developing	the	hospital’s	maternity	ward,
have	stated	that	doctors,	nurses,	pregnant	women,	and	babies	were	the	targets	of	the	terrorists	from	the	start.
The	U.S.	Special	Representative	for	Afghanistan	Reconciliation,	Zalmay	Khalilzad,	stated	that	the	ISIS	affiliate,
Islamic	State	–	Khorasan	Province	(IS-KP),	was	behind	the	hospital	attack.	He	did	not	blame	the	Taliban,	which
drew	critical	reactions	from	not	only	the	government	of	President	Ashraf	Ghani,	but	also	from	many	people	across
Afghanistan,	as	many	Afghans	believe	that	the	West	has	been	sanitising	the	Taliban’s	image,	overlooking	their
terrorist	activities	and	ties.	Despite	the	recent	peace	talks,	many	also	hold	the	view	that	the	Taliban	have	taken	few
real	steps	for	peace.
While	the	Taliban	denied	involvement	in	the	attack,	there	is	significant	evidence	tying	them	directly	to	it	through
their	Haqqani	network,	led	by	Sirajuddin	Haqqani.	From	our	private	conversations	in	the	middle	of	May	with	law
enforcement,	security	and	military	officials	in	the	West,	it	has	become	clear	to	us	that	the	Taliban	has	accepted	and
conceded	that	several	major	terrorist	attacks	in	Afghanistan	did	indeed	involve	collaboration	between	IS-KP,	the
Taliban’s	Haqqani	network	and	other	terror	groups	based	in	Pakistan.
Challenges	to	the	Peace	Talks
On	17	May	2020,	President	Ghani	and	the	former	Chief	Executive	of	Afghanistan,	Abdullah	Abdullah,	signed	a
power-sharing	agreement	in	which	it	was	agreed	that	Abdullah	would	take	a	leading	role	in	peace	and	reconciliation
talks	with	the	Taliban.	The	international	community	was	quick	to	support	the	formation	of	an	inclusive	government	–
a	positive	development	in	the	stability	and	solidarity	for	Afghanistan’s	political	apparatus.
However,	it	remains	to	be	seen	how	the	Taliban	will	ever	agree	to	a	comprehensive	peace	agreement	that	ends
violence,	safeguards	civil	society	and	women’s	rights,	and	eliminates	terrorist	safe	havens	for	al-Qaeda	and	IS-KP.
In	the	eyes	of	many,	there	is	perhaps	a	greater	prospect	of	finding	a	vaccine	for	COVID-19	than	seeing	a	day	when
the	Taliban	will	truly	commit	themselves	to	finding	a	lasting	peace.	(Incidentally,	there	are	reports	which	suggest	the
coronavirus	has	spread	within	the	hierarchy	of	the	Taliban	in	both	Doha,	Qatar	and	Quetta,	Pakistan.)
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The	recent	brutal	attacks	in	Afghanistan	occurred	during	the	COVID-19	pandemic	when	the	West	has	been
understandably	distracted,	but	it	has	laid	bare	major	weaknesses	of	the	29	February	2020	Doha	agreement
between	the	U.S.	and	the	Taliban.	On	27	May,	a	United	Nations	report	stated	that	the	Taliban	have	retained	close
links	to	al-Qaeda	and	sought	its	counsel	during	the	negotiations	with	U.S.	officials,	despite	promising	to	break	ties
with	the	terror	group	based	on	the	Doha	agreement.
Furthermore,	nothing	in	the	Doha	deal	technically	obliges	the	Taliban	to	prevent	the	atrocities	Afghanistan	has
witnessed	in	recent	months.	The	timing	of	the	hospital	attack,	therefore,	needs	to	be	seen	in	the	context	of	other
events	that	illustrate	the	murky	nexus	that	exists	between	different	entities	whose	every	action	results	in	a	set	of
devastating	attacks	on	the	Afghan	people.
The	Aslam	Farooqi	Revelations
On	25	March,	a	Sikh	gurdwara	was	attacked	by	suicide	bombers	and	gunmen	in	Kabul.	25	people	were	killed	in	the
coordinated	assault.	IS-KP	claimed	responsibility.	Soon	after,	in	a	significant	counter-terrorism	operation,	Aslam
Farooqi	(aka	Abdullah	Orakzai),	the	Pakistani	leader	of	IS-KP,	was	arrested	in	Kandahar	province	by	Afghanistan’s
National	Directorate	of	Security	(NDS).
During	the	time	of	his	arrest,	Farooqi	provided	the	names	and	locations	of	other	members	of	IS-KP.	Subsequently,
the	NDS	conducted	a	number	of	successful	operations,	including	arresting	Farooqi’s	predecessor	as	head	of	IS-KP,
Mawlawi	Ziaul	Haq	(aka	Abu	Omar	Khorasani),	who	had	retained	a	prominent	position	within	the	terror	network.
Critically,	Farooqi	revealed	what	many	in	the	West	had	suspected	over	the	last	eight	months.	Under	his	reign	as
head	of	IS-KP,	his	terrorist	group	had	not	only	cooperated	with	the	Haqqani	network,	but	also	with	the	proscribed
Pakistani	terrorist	outfits	Jaish-e-Mohammd	(JeM)	and	the	Lashkar-e-Taiba	(LeT),	the	latter	of	which	Farooqi	was
once	a	member.	The	LeT	was	behind	the	synchronised	2008	Mumbai	Siege	Attacks	that	killed	166	people;	and	the
JeM’s	most	notorious	recruit	was	the	British-Pakistani	Ahmed	Omar	Saeed	Sheikh	who	was	involved	in	the
abduction	and	brutal	murder	of	American	journalist	Daniel	Pearl	of	the	Wall	Street	Journal.
From	our	recent	interviews	with	Afghan	security	officials	on	the	attack,	it	has	become	clear	that	the	individuals
tasked	to	carry	out	the	attacks	received	training	at	JeM	camps	at	Chaman	and	Tolandi	in	Pakistan.	The	LeT
provided	the	operatives	and	identified	the	targets	in	Afghanistan	that	are	principally	designed	to	undermine	the
Afghan	government	and	sow	social,	economic,	and	political	tensions.	The	Haqqani	network,	having	substantial
resources	through	their	criminal	enterprises,	provided	coordination	and	logistical	planning.	IS-KP	assisted	and
initiated	propaganda	output	while	taking	overall	responsibility	for	the	attack.	Farooqi’s	admissions	enabled	Afghan
security	forces	to	dismantle	various	IS-KP	networks	tied	to	the	Haqqani	network.
The	common	denominator	with	these	groups	is	that	they	all	have	retained	relationships	with	the	Inter-Services
Intelligence	Directorate	(ISI),	which	raises	questions	about	how	much	the	Pakistani	military	establishment	knew
about	these	attacks.	This	has	strained	ties	between	the	Afghan	and	Pakistani	governments	as	accusations	mount
from	Kabul	that	Pakistan	had	prior	knowledge	of	the	attack	and	intended	to	maintain	plausible	deniability	by	using
different	groups	for	various	stages	of	the	terrorist	plot.
Unravelling	the	Complexities	of	the	IS-KP	Axis
Among	the	myriad	of	extremist	organisations	that	operate	within	Afghanistan,	it	is	important	to	understand	the
complexities	of	their	structures,	including	within	IS-KP,	which	is	not	a	single	monolithic	group.	In	the	summer	of
2019,	IS-KP	split	into	two	factions:	one	Pakistani	grouping	led	by	Farooqi,	and	the	other	alliance	of	Central	Asians.
The	Central	Asians	suspected	Farooqi	of	being	an	agent	of	the	Pakistani	ISI,	or	at	least	of	having	links	to	them,	and
believed	IS-KP	was	being	hijacked	by	the	Pakistani	military.	In	response,	the	Central	Asian	contingent	relocated	to
northern	Afghanistan	attempting	to	create	a	large	hub	in	the	Badakhshan	districts	of	Warduj,	Jurm,	and	Yamgan.
Understandably,	the	assumption	some	make	in	the	West	is	that	the	Taliban	cannot	achieve	a	sustainable
coexistence	with	IS-KP	as	the	two	organisations	compete	for	territory,	recruits,	and	sources	of	revenue.	The	reality
is	that	there	has	been	a	consolidated	marriage	of	convenience	between	IS-KP,	the	Haqqanis,	JeM,	and	LeT	for
quite	some	time.	They	share	common	enemies:	the	democratically-elected	Afghan	government	and	the	West,
which	once	stood	in	their	way,	but	now	is	seeking	a	speedy	exit	strategy	from	Afghanistan.
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Immediately	after	Farooqi’s	arrest,	Ehsanullah	Ehsan,	a	former	Taliban	spokesman	and	associate	of	Farooqi,
claimed	on	social	media	that	the	NDS’s	announcement	of	the	arrest	was	false.	Ehsan	was	able	to	escape	house
arrest	in	Pakistan	and	somehow	ended	up	in	Turkey.	The	Taliban	released	an	official	statement	echoing	Eshan’s
claims.	The	uniformity	in	statements	is	evidence	of	a	collaborative	IS-KP-Taliban	relationship.
Despite	having	some	foreign	terrorist	fighters	(FTF)	in	its	ranks,	the	IS-KP	leaders,	including	Hafiz	Saeed	Khan,
Abdul	Haseeb	Loghari,	Abu	Saad	Erhabi,	Abu	Omar	Khorasani,	and	Aslam	Farooqi,	have	so	far	all	been	Pakistani
nationals,	reiterating	the	group’s	Pakistani	connection.	Moreover,	Urdu,	and	not	Pashto	or	Dari,	is	the	language	of
communication	for	IS-KP.
Reflections
Looking	back	at	the	attacks	on	the	Sikh	gurdwara	and	the	Kabul	hospital	as	well	as	the	capture	of	Farooqi	by
Afghan	security	officials,	they	provide	much	perspective	as	to	the	challenges	Afghanistan	currently	faces.
By	revealing	that	IS-KP	has	a	strong	relationship	with	JeM,	LeT	and	the	Haqqani	network,	it	makes	it	even	more
questionable	why	the	Pakistani	government	asked	for	Farooqi’s	extradition.	There	are	perhaps	concerns	he	may
reveal	too	much	about	his	relationship	with	the	Pakistani	military	and	this	could	affect	Pakistan’s	‘grey	listing’	with
the	Financial	Action	Task	Force	(FATF).	Interestingly,	Pakistan	has	never	taken	any	legal	action	against	Farooqi	for
his	alleged	anti-Pakistan	activities,	such	as	of	filing	a	case	against	him	or	placing	him	in	Schedule-IV	of	the	Anti-
Terrorism	Act	1997.
Following	the	capture	of	Farooqi,	Human	Rights	Watch	called	on	the	Afghan	government	to	bring	appropriate	war
crimes	charges	against	him	based	on	Article	337	of	Afghanistan’s	penal	code	for	his	alleged	role	in	directing	attacks
against	civilians	in	Afghanistan.	It	will	be	very	telling	if	the	Taliban	at	some	point	request	Farooqi’s	release.
Presently,	IS-KP	remains	headquartered	in	Nangarhar,	the	transit	route	of	the	lucrative	drug	trade,	near	Pakistan’s
border.	The	COVID-19	outbreak	already	has,	and	will,	continue	to	affect	terrorist	activity	around	the	globe	in	a
myriad	of	ways;	the	closing	of	borders	will	make	transnational	enterprises	more	difficult,	yet	the	distraction	and
vulnerability	caused	by	the	virus	has	left	vacuums	for	terrorist	networks	to	exploit	in	Afghanistan.
Aslam	Farooqi’s	revelations	of	the	IS-KP	hydra	with	the	Haqqani	network,	JeM,	and	LeT	weaves	a	complex
tapestry	of	collusion	and	cooperation	between	several	terrorist	organizations,	criminal	entities,	and	the	Pakistani
military	that	has	dire	implications	for	the	security	of	Afghanistan	and	the	world.	Despite	Farooqi’s	capture,	the
relationships	between	IS-KP,	the	Haqqani	network,	JeM,	and	LeT	seem	likely	to	grow	in	the	future	as	their	aims
continue	to	align.
This	article	gives	the	views	of	the	authors,	and	not	the	position	of	the	South	Asia	@	LSE	blog,	nor	of	the	London
School	of	Economics.	Featured	image:	Network	Connections;	Geralt,	Pixabay.
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